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AN ANALYSIS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES
PROVIDED BY SECTION 262.05 (3), (4) AND (10)
INTRODUCTION
The jurisdiction statute adopted by the Wisconsin legislature in
19591 seeks to extend the personal jurisdiction of Wisconsin courts to
the limits allowed by the due process clause of the United States Con-
stitution.2 Perhaps the most litigated jurisdictional area today is that
which concerns manufacturers involved in multi-state transactions.
Wherever a particular product might be found, there is a possibility
of litigation arising out of its purchase or use. The purpose of this dis-
cussion is to analyze those provisions of section 262.05 of the Wiscon-
sin Statutes (1963) which are most generally involved in this type of
case, in order to assess the extent to which the language therein offers
constitutional guidelines for use in products liability litigation.
JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 262.05 (3), (4) AND (10)
The pertinent statutes are set out below. An analysis of each fol-
lows later in the article.
262.05 Personal jurisdiction, grounds for generally. A court of
this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter has
jurisdiction over a person served in an action pursuant
to s. 262.06 under any of the following circumstances:
(3) Local act or omission. In any action claiming injury to
person or property within or without this state arising
out of an act or omission within this state by the de-
fendant.
(4) Local injury; foreign act. In any action claiming injury
to person or property within this state arising out of an
act or omission outside this state by the defendant, pro-
vided in addition that at the time of the injury either:
(a) Solicitation or service activities were carried on
within this state by or on behalf of the defendant;
or
(b) Products, materials or things processed, serviced or
manufactured by the defendant were used or con-
sumed within this state in the ordinary course of
trade.
(10) Insurance or insurers. In any action which arises out of
a promise made anywhere to the plaintiff or some third
party by the defendant to insure upon or against the hap-
pening of an event and in addition either:
1 Wis. Laws 1959, ch. 226.
2The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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(a) The person insured was a resident of this state when
the event out of which the cause of action is claimed
to arise occurred; or
(b) The event out of which the cause of action is
claimed to arise occurred within this state, regardless
of where the person insured resided.
In addition to the above cited provisions, Section 262.01 should be
mentioned. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has several times announced
the following rule of statutory construction:
This court is disposed to give statutes regulating procedure a
liberal interpretation. (Citations omitted) Another rule of statu-
tory construction which we deem to be applicable here is that
great consideration should be given to the object sought to be
accomplished by a statute.3
262.01 LEGISLATIVE INTENT. This Chapter shall be lib-
erally construed to the end that actions be speedily and finally
determined on their merits. The rule that statutes in derogation
of the common law must be strictly construed does not apply to
this chapter.
In order for a state to exercise valid jurisdiction through its courts,
three constitutional requirements must be satisfied.' First, the state it-
self must have a basis for exercising jurisdiction. This basis, an in-
herent power, is derived from certain contacts with the parties or their
property making it reasonable for the state to affect relations between
parties.- Second, the state must have conferred this power on the court,
thereby making the court competent to adjudicate the particular litiga-
tion in question.' Finally, a reasonable method must be employed to
apprise the defendant of the proceedings so that he has a reasonable
opportunity to be heard.7
In enacting Chapter 262 of the Wisconsin Statutes, the legislature
sought to make the courts of general jurisdiction competent to the limit
of the state's power to adjudicate controversies. Thus, this discussion
will consider only the problems raised by the first requirement men-
tioned above.
THE LIMITS OF STATE COURT JURISDICTION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL SHOE CO. V. WASHINGTON"
A. Historical Background of International Shoe.
Historically, territory was the prime measure of a state's judicial
power. The judicial competence of a state could not be extended be-
3 Huck v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 4 Wis. 2d 132, 137, 90 N.WV. 2d
154, 157 (1957).
4 ROSENBERG & WEINSTEIN, ELEMENITS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 997 (1962).
5 14 Ama. JuR. Courts §11 (1938).
621 C.J.S. Courts §1 (1940).
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914).
s 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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yond the state's boundaries.9 In personam jurisdiction was originally
grounded upon the court's de facto powers over the defendant i.e.,
upon the power of the sheriff to enforce writs and other process upon
the defendant's person. "Presence" within the jurisdiction was there-
fore indispensable.
Pennoyer v. Neff"0 established the proposition that a judgment in
personam against a non-resident is generally void and violates the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment unless the non-resident
appears or is served personally within the state. This territorial limita-
tion of state court power permitted non-residents to immunize them-
selves from personal liability simply by leaving the forum state, creating
a "hit and run" tactic in civil litigation. This situation led to a host of
fictitious definitions of "presence," to permit the effective recapture of the
fugitive "non-residents," including corporate entities. The principal
bases of these fictions were "implied consent,"11 and "doing business
within the state."'1
International Shoe Co. v. Washington undertook a broad redefini-
tion of the principle of Pennoyer v. Neff, and suggested that a further
conglomeration of judicial fictions would never produce a universal,
factually based standard by which the power to adjudicate could be
measured. A new test for determining jurisdiction was proposed, ef-
fectively abrogating the "fictions".
B. The International Shoe Test and Subsequent Applications.
Although International Shoe could easily have been decided on the
"doing business" theory, the Court chose rather to rest its decision on a
totally restated doctrine:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defend-
ant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it
such that the maintenance of suit does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. ' 13
Further, the court noted that:
[W]hether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of
the due process to insure. That clause does not contemplate that
a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an
individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no
contacts, ties, or relations. 14
9 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
10 Ibid.
11 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
12 International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
13 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 8, at 316.
14 Id. at 319.
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Before deciding that the International Shoe Company had engaged
in sufficient activities so that it was not unreasonable to allow the state
of Washington to exercise jurisdiction over it, the Supreme Court ex-
amined various possible "contacts, ties, or relations" which might or
might not be sufficient to enable a state to exercise jurisdiction over a
non-resident. The court found that a continuous pattern of activities
always affords sufficient contact with the state to sustain jurisdiction,
when the cause of action arises out of those activities.
'Presence' in the state in this sense has never been doubted when
the activities of the corporation there have not only been con-
tinuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued
on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to an
agent to accept service of process has been given.15
The court also observed that casual presence or isolated activity
conducted by the defendant within the state, and unconnected with
the cause of action, does not afford sufficient contact.
Conversely it has been generally recognized that the casual pres-
ence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or iso-
lated items of activities in a state in the corporation's behalf are
not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected
with the activities there.'8
The court next recognized that continuous activity may be of such
quality and nature as to enable state courts to obtain valid jurisdiction
over non-residents even on causes of action unrelated to the activities.17
Finally, the court found that certain single or isolated acts by the de-
fendant within the state, because of their quality and nature, may be
sufficient contact to allow jurisdiction. 8
Two subsequent cases tended, in some degree, to clarify the standard
created by International Shoe. The first was McGee v. International
Life Insurance Co.'5 Defendant insurance company, a Texas corpora-
tion, solicited by mail a reinsurance contract from a California resident.
The contract was accepted and premiums were paid in California, but
defendant had no other business or activity within California. The
court, speaking through Justice Black, evaluated defendant's contacts
with the State of California and held them sufficient to allow California
to maintain the suit.
Turning to this case we think it apparent that the Due Process
Clause did not preclude the California court from entering a
judgment binding on respondent. It is sufficient for purposes of
'5 Id. at 317.
16 Ibid.
17 International Shoe Co. v .Washington, supra note 8, at 318.
is Ibid.
19 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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due process that the suit was based on a contract which had sub-
stantial connection with that state.20 (Emphasis added.)
The McGee case, therefore, illustrates a situation in which a single,
isolated activity within the forum state was of such "nature and quality"
that due process was not offended by allowing jurisdiction.21
The second significant application of the International Shoe standard
was in Hanson v. Denckla.12 The Pennsylvania settlor of a trust created
in Delaware and having a Delaware trustee, subsequently moved to
Florida. The trustee thereafter remitted the trust income to the settlor
in Florida, and the settlor performed other acts of trust business there.
The trustee, however, transacted no other business in Florida, nor did
it have an office there. The trust assets remained in Delaware, and
there was no solicitation in Florida either by mail or through agents.
Certain powers of appointment were exercised in Florida, and the
plaintiffs (cestuis, primarily Florida domiciliaries) brought suit in
Florida to determine the effect of this exercise of the powers.
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, found that the
Florida court had no jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee.
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship
with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of
contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will
vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but
it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conduct-
ing activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws.23
The Hanson case has imposed a definite limitation upon the exercise
of state court jurisdiction, by requiring an activity by which the de-
fendant "purposefully avails itself" of the benefits and protections of
the forum state's laws. The most interesting aspect of the Hanson case
is its apparent attempt to limit the effect of McGee to highly regulated
areas where the state has a special interest.24
AN ANALYSIS OF VARIous FACT SITUATIONS
A. Local Act or Omission
Section 262.05 (3) requires the allegation of two jurisdictional facts.
20 Id. at 223. See Elkhart Engineering Corp. v. Werke, 343 F. 2d 861 (5th Cir.
1965).
21 See generally Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm; Eight Years of Ex-
tended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L. F. 538-544 (1963), condensed
in 1964 PERSONAL INJURY COMMENTATOR 278.
22357 U.S. 235 (1958).
23 Id. at 253.
24 "This case is also different from McGee in that there the State had enacted
special legislation (Unauthorized Insurers Process Act) to exercise what
McGee called its 'manifest interest' in providing effective redress for citizens
who had been injured by nonresidents engaged in an activity that the State
treats as exceptional and subjects to special regulation." Id. at 252. See Trippe
Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 270 F. 2d 821 (7th Cir. 1959). But cf. Currie,
supra note 21 at 549, 1964 PERSONAL INJURY COMMENTATOR at 289.
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First, the defendant or his agent must act or omit to act within this
state. Secondly, there must be injury to person or property within or
without the state because of the act or omission.2 5 There is no problem,
of course, where no nonresident (or unlicensed) defendant is involved.
Where the plaintiff is a resident, again there seems to be no constitu-
tional problem in allowing jurisdiction by the state in which the act or
omission took place, even though the act or omission is an isolated one,
where the injury arises therefrom. The state has a genuine interest in
protecting its residents from the conduct of defendants within its
borders.
A recent New York case has applied the principle under a New
York statute allowing jurisdiction over one who "commits a tortious
act within this state."26 An Illinois manufacturer had shipped a mis-
labeled, defective hammer to a New York distributor, where it was
purchased from a retailer by the plaintiff. Sometime later, plaintiff was
injured in Connecticut, allegedly as a result of a defect in the hammer.
The New York court founded its jurisdiction on the fact that a tortious
act, namely, the commercial circulation in New York of the defective
hammer, had proximately caused the plaintiff's eventual injury:
(T)here are some breaches of duty which create a continuing
condition of hazard to users, very much like an enjoinable
nuisance which may ground a cause of action short of the harm
having yet occurred. (Citations omitted). In the case of an
instrument defective in construction or dangerous because mis-
labeled the hazard persists wherever and so long as the product
circulates.1
7
What would happen under similar facts invoking the Wisconsin
statute? Assume that "an act or omission" can be found to have oc-
curred within Wisconsin only by use of the somewhat strained reason-
ing adopted in New York. Also assume that the negligent manufacturer
had lost control over the circulation of his product, had no agent or
office and conducted no solicitation activities here. Can it be said that
the negligent manufacturer has purposely availed himself of the bene-
fits and protections of Wisconsin laws? Or that he has had sufficient
contact with Wisconsin, by reason of the fact that he could possibly
have foreseen that one or more of his products could have eventually
been circulated in Wisconsin, to justify assertion of jurisdiction?
Cases such as this, involving both resident and nonresident plain-
tiffs, are not uncommon in the area of products liability. In a fair num-
ber of such cases, Wisconsin would seem to have very little interest
in providing a Wisconsin forum for a nonresident. There has been no
injury within Wisconsin, no manufacturing or sales activity within Wis-
25 30 Wis. STAT. ANN. 24 (Supp. 1965).
6 Singer v. Walker, 21 App. Div. 285, 250 N.Y.S. 2d 216 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
27 Id. at 289, 250 N.Y.S. 2d at 221.
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consin, and no Wisconsin resident is involved. Yet, under the broad
language of section 262.05(3), the action could be brought here, be-
cause no Wisconsin interest is required. Professor Currie states that
he is "aware of no decision of the United States Supreme Court per-
mitting suit in a state other than that in which the defendant is resi-
dent or present, in the absence of an interest in the application of the
forum State's law."
28
B. Local Injury, Foreign Act.
The necessary jurisdictional facts required under Section 262.05(4)
are: (1) injury to person or property within this state arising out of an
act or omission outside this state; (2) provided, however, that in addi-
tion to (1) there must be either: (a) solicitation or service activities
carried on by the defendant or his agent within this state, or (b) pro-
ducts, materials or things processed, serviced or manufactured by the
defendant used or consumed in the ordinary course of trade within
this state. The principal constitutional danger presented by this section
involves the construction of the additional criteria.
For example, Judge Sobeloff suggested an interesting hypothetical
problem in Erlanger Mills Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills:
To illustrate the logical and not too improbable extension of
the problem, let us consider the hesitancy a California dealer
might feel if asked to sell a set of tires to a tourist with Pennsyl-
vania license plates, knowing that he might be required to de-
fend in the courts of Pennsylvania a suit for refund of the pur-
chase price or for heavy damages in case of accident attributed
to a defect in the tires.2 9
Substituting a tourist with Wisconsin license plates, would the
Wisconsin court hold that the transaction produced a thing processed
or serviced by the defendant and used by the plaintiff in the ordinary
course of trade within this State? This certainly would not be an un-
reasonable construction of the statute. But again, if the plaintiff is not
a resident of Wisconsin, this state's legitimate interest in the contro-
versy is suspect; and again, there is a serious question whether the
Hanson test is met.
Has the defendant California tire dealer purposefully availed him-
self of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, and
has he invoked the benefits and protections of its laws? If, in fact, the
California tire dealer is set up to do business on a national scale, then
perhaps the "ordinary course of business" language would be appropri-
ate, but for the local dealer who has no intention of soliciting business
in Wisconsin this application would be ridiculously strained.
28 See Currie, supra note 21 at 544, 1964 PERSONAL INJURY COMMENTATOR at 285.
29239 F. 2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956). See also Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State
Courts Over Nonresidents in Our Federal System, 43 CORNELL L. Q. 196,
206 (1957).
19651
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The significant fact is that this type of case can easily fit the literal
terms of Section 262.05 (4). The revisor's notes suggest this interpre-
tation:
If the occurrence in the state of the injury sued on is not a suf-
ficient contact, very little more by way of additional contact is
required for the exercise of personal jurisdiction in these cases.
: . . These contacts have included solicitation of business, serv-
icing equipment within the state and, in some cases, little more
than the fact that the defendant enjoyed pecuniary benefit from
the efforts of others in the state who sold goods manufactured
by the defendant. Sub. (4) relies on such added contacts as
those just stated to furnish a basis for jurisdiction in cases
where a local injury arises out of some foreign act.30
C. Insurance and Insurers.
Se~tion 262.05(10) requires: (1) that the defendant promise the
plaintiff or some third party that he would insure him upon or against
the happening of an event; and (2), either (a) that the insured was a
resident of this state when the insured event from which the cause of
action arises occurred, or (b) that the insured event which gives rise
to the cause of action occurred within the state. This provision involves
more perplexing constitutional problems because the highly regulated
insurance industry is one in which each state has a special interest.3
The Hanson case emphasizes the state's special interest in providing
effective redress against nonresidents engaged in exceptional activity.2
Assuming a case where an Ohio resident purchased a policy of in-
surance and then moved to Wisconsin, where he resided when the
insured event occurred in Indiana, could a Wisconsin court validly
exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident insurance corporation which
had no contact with Wisconsin other than the fact that the insured
mailed premiums from Wisconsin? Under the literal language of the
statute, the answer is an unhesitating affirmative. There is a promise
to insure against the happening of an event, and the person insured
is a resident of this state.
Nevertheless, unlike the McGee case, there is in the suggested prob-
lem no contract accepted in Wisconsin. Indeed, the case is very similar
to Hanson, where a Pennsylvania settlor later moved to Florida. The
Hanson court commented on the significance of this difference:
30 30 Wis. STAT. ANN. 26 (Supp. 1965). See also Newan v. Charles S. Nathan,
Inc., 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2509 ( ), where personal jurisdiction over non-
domiciliary manufacturers was upheld by the Supreme Court of New York
where a Kentucky manufacturer sold a component part to a North Carolina
manufacturer, who subsequently incorporated the component parts into a
chair and sold them to a distributor in New York where the plaintiff was
injured. The court allowed jurisdiction on the ground that it could reasonably
be anticipated that there would be New York sales of this specific product,
or of this product as a component of other products.
31 See note 22 supra.
3 Ibid.
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Noting the interest California has in providing effective redress
for its residents when nonresident insurers refuse to pay claims
on insurance, they have solicietd in that State, the Court upheldjurisdiction because the suit 'was based on a contract which had
substantial connection with that State.' In contrast, this action
involves the validity of an agreement that was entered without
any connection with the forum State.33
Even allowing for the exceptional activity argument (although
trust administration is also highly regulated) ,4 it would seem difficult
to justify a valid exercise of jurisdiction in the hypothetical case.35 Yet
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld jurisdiction under the
Tennessee Unauthorized Insurance Process Act where the only con-
tacts with the State of Tennessee by the insurance company were the
mailing of premiums by the insured from Tennessee, and the fact that
the insurer had hired persons to investigate Tennessee claimsA6
THE EFFECT OF THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS
UPON PERSONA. JURIsDICTION
Divergent opinions have been expressed regarding the effect of
forum non conveniens upon personal jurisdiction. The first position is
best summarized by Professor Foster:
It is submitted that the factor of inconvenience to the defendant
is not part of the test whether jurisdiction over his person exists;
and it is relevant to the case only if raised by the plea of forum
non conveniens after a finding by the court that jurisdiction over
the defendant was established. This confines the test of jurisdic-
tion to an examination of the nature of the person's contacts with
the state and the relation of the cause of action sued upon to
those contacts. The question of inconvenience would enter the
case only if personal jurisdiction were found to exist and would
be treated along with other relevant factors under the doctrine
of forum non conveniens.17
Professor Foster was joined in his opinion by a majority of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Lau v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. 8
The second position has been taken by Justices Hallows and Fair-
child of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. In a concurring opinion in the
Lau case, Justice Hallows stated that:
International Shoe Co. v. Washington . . . makes the incon-
venience to the defendant one of the elements to be considered
33 Ibid.
34 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
35 This position was taken by the Florida court in Parmalee v. Commercial
Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n., 206 F. 2d 523 (5th Cir. 1953), where the court
held that the Florida Unauthorized Insurers Process Act did not apply to a
similar fact situation.
.G Schutt v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n., 229 F. 2d 158 (2d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 940 (1956).
37 Foster, Personal Jurisdiction Based on Local Causes of Action, 1956 XVIs.
L. R. 522, 543.
38 14 Wis. 2d 329, 111 N.W. 2d 138 (1961).
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in determining whether relatively slight contacts with a state are
sufficient so that exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of that
State fulfill (sic) the due-process requirement; otherwise, the test
of what will amount to the minimal of contacts is purely a mech-
anical and quantitative measure rather than the due-process con-
cept of minimal contacts which is the equivalent of jurisdiction.39
The position of Justice Hallows is based upon a distinction between
forum non conveniens and "an estimate of the inconveniences" to the
defendant in litigation away from its home state. Chief Justice Stone,
citing Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert,40 stated that "an 'estimate of the
inconveniences' which would result to the corporation from a trial away
from its 'home' or principal place of business is relevant in this con-
nection," 41 the connection being whether or not the demands of due
process have been met in the particular case. Since the Hutchinson
case did not determine how the inconvenience to the defendant was
to be decided, and since the case did not decide whether a balancing
of the inconvenience to each party should be undertaken, Justice Hal-
lows concludes that the due process inquiry differs from the plea forum
non conveniens. The upshot of this analysis is that:
The inconvenience to the defendant of being sued in the forum
may be of such magnitude as not to satisfy due process and
would violate traditional notions of fair play and substanitial
justice, but such inconvenience considered under the broader
issue of forum non conveniens may be relatively less than the
inconvenience to the plaintiff and other factors taken into con-
sideration in applying such doctrine.42
The two opinions above mentioned indicate first, that the broad
issue of forum non conveniens does not affect personal jurisdiction,
since application of that doctrine presupposes that valid jurisdiction
exists. Secondly, it is plain that Justice Hallows would interpret the
dicta of International Shoe43 to require, as an element for deciding
the due process question of personal jurisdiction, an investigation of
the inconvenience to the defendant.
A further problem arises, since the International Shoe case made
no mention of the question of inconvenience to the defendant where the
obligations sued upon arose out of or were connected with the de-
fendant's activities within this state. 44 Section 262.05 (4)45 requires no
connection at all between the act or omission and the solicitation activi-
39 Id. at 338.
40 45 F. 2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930).
11 International Shoe, op. cit. supra note 8, at 317.
42 Lau, op. cit. supra note 38, at 340.
43 International Shoe, op. cit. supra note 8, at 317.
44A procedure which compels the defendant to come to the state to defend
such a suit "can, in most instances, hardly be said to he undue." International
Shoe, op. cit. supra note 8, at 319.
45 Cf. text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
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ties, use or consumption within this state. In addition, a literal reading
of the statute suggests that Section 262.05(4) (a) contemplates any
solicitation, even though it is phrased in plural form. It would seem
that consideration of the inconvenience to the defendant would thus
be a serious constitutional question under a fact situation where the
activities of the defendant were unconnected with the cause of action
being litigated.
CONCLUSION
It is not the purpose of this article to speculate on how far courts
should extend jurisdiction over nonresidents. The purpose rather, is
to point out that the provisions under analysis contain language which,
literally read, could easily extend Wisconsin's claims of jurisdiction
beyond constitutional limits. An analysis of principal United States
Supreme Court holdings has been included, both to indicate the his-
torical development of the trend toward expand jurisdiction, and to
demonstrate that the constitutional problems have not begun to be
finally or definitively resolved. Chapter 262 is a progressive and de-
termined effort to exhaust state court jurisdictional power. The legisla-
tive intent should certainly be effectuated, but not at the risk of un-
constitutionality. As the Hanson court so aptly stated, "it is a mistake
to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions
on the personal jurisdiction of state courts."46
The central question raised by all of these tests is constant, i.e., does
a state have inherent power to determine a given controversy so as to
confer that power upon its courts? Blanket formulations to cover in-
finite varieties of cases are an inevitably risky business at best, and
especially so when no constitutional guidelines are yet available. The
merit of a statute of the type under examination is that it may accelerate
the process by which more reliable constitutional definition will be
achieved.
FRANCIS J. PODVIN
46 Siepra note 22 at 251.
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